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Phillips v. City of Whitefish; Legislative or Administrative, that is
the Referendum Question
Michelle Tafoya
I. INTRODUCTION
Under Montana law, the power of citizens to repeal local
government resolutions by referendum extends only to legislative acts.1
In Phillips v. City of Whitefish,2 the Montana Supreme Court held that a
resolution amending an interlocal agreement between the City of
Whitefish and Flathead County was an administrative act, despite the
legislative nature of the original interlocal agreement.3
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case stems from a local control and land use dispute
between the City of Whitefish, Flathead County, and the citizens of both
caught in between. The City of Whitefish has implemented several
regulatory policies to protect its vibrant downtown, highway corridors,
and pristine natural resources, considered vital to its tourism and
recreation based economy.4 In contrast, Flathead County’s much more
permissive land-use planning scheme has resulted in a hodgepodge of
subdivisions, big-box stores, mini-storage facilities, billboards, and
stream and lakeshore setbacks.5
In 1967, Flathead County and the City of Whitefish created a
joint planning board whereby the county agreed to cede its planning
authority to the city for the one mile extraterritorial area (ETA),
otherwise known as the “donut,” surrounding Whitefish.6 In 2005, the
two parties not only formalized this relationship with an interlocal
agreement (2005 IA), but also extended Whitefish’s ETA to two miles.7
This agreement was mutually beneficial for both parties: the 2005 IA
enabled the county to save financial resources by abdicating its planning
responsibilities in the donut, and the city was given the opportunity to
define and protect the area’s unique character.
As part of this goal, Whitefish adopted the very controversial
Critical Areas Ordinance (CAO) in 2008, “which imposed zoning
restrictions in the donut to protect lakes, streams, wetlands, and drainage
. Mont. Code Ann. § 7–5–131 (2013); Town of Whitehall v. Preece, 956 P.2d 743 (Mont. 1998).
. Phillips v. City of Whitefish, 330 P.3d 442 (Mont. 2014).
3
. Id. at 445–446.
4
. Appellant’s Opening Br., Phillips v. City of Whitefish, http://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/
getDocument?documentid=77004 at 11 (No. DA 13–0472, 330 P.3d 442 (2014)).
5
. Id.
6
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 445–446.
7
. Id. at 446.
1
2
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areas from development.”8 The county opposed the CAO and, upon its
adoption by the city, voted to unilaterally withdraw from the 2005 IA. 9
Since the 2005 IA expressly stated that the agreement could only be
terminated by mutual consent of the parties, the City of Whitefish filed a
lawsuit to enforce the agreement.10 The district court refused to do so,
finding the 2005 IA unenforceable.11 On appeal, the Montana Supreme
Court reversed the district court’s ruling, imposed a preliminary
injunction to prevent Flathead County from exercising planning authority
in donut, and remanded the case for trial.12
The parties then entered into negotiations to see if a settlement
could be reached.13 After eight months and several public meetings, the
parties negotiated a 2010 interlocal agreement (2010 IA) that: (1)
allowed for unilateral termination as long as the terminating party gave
one year’s notice and agreed to participate in alternative dispute
resolution; and (2) was subject to renewal by both parties after five
years.14 Most Whitefish residents were opposed to the 2010 IA: however,
despite the “substantial objection from almost all of the persons who
spoke in public on the matter,” the Whitefish City Council passed
Resolution 10–46, adopting the 2010 IA on November 15, 2010.15 At the
same meeting, the council also adopted Resolution 10–47 which
“authorized the City to seek dismissal of the 2008 lawsuit.”16 Flathead
County followed suit and the lawsuit was dismissed on July 11, 2011.17
Dissatisfied with the city’s approval of Resolution 10–46, both
Whitefish and donut residents decided to take action.18 By January 2011,
a referendum petition to repeal the resolution was approved under state
law form and compliance standards.19 By April 2011, citizens had
gathered the required signatures and the Flathead County Election
Department certified the referendum for the November election.20
Finally, after over ten months of citizen effort, Resolution 10–46 passed
by a two-to-one margin on November 8, 2011.21
Failing at the ballot box, the plaintiffs in this case filed a lawsuit
in Flathead District Court to challenge the referendum’s validity. The
plaintiffs argued that the referendum sought to repeal an administrative
. Id.
. Id.
10
. City of Whitefish v. Bd. of Co. Commrs. of Flathead Co. ex rel. Brenneman, 199 P.3d 201, 203
(Mont. 2008).
11
. Id.
12
. Id. at 208.
13
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 446.
14
. Id.
15
. Appellant’s Opening Br., supra n. 4, at 12.
16
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 446–447.
17
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 447.
18
. Id.
19
. Id.
20
. Id.
21
. Id.
8
9
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action, rather than a legislative action and, as such, the citizens’
referenda power did not extend to Resolution 10–46.22 Co-defendants,
the City of Whitefish and the Flathead County Commissioners,
responded immediately with breach of contract claims against each other
with respect to the 2005 and 2010 IAs.23 Additionally, the district court
granted a motion to intervene for four citizens and the “Let Whitefish
Vote” ballot committee (Intervenors).24 The Intervenors argued that the
plaintiff’s suit should be dismissed because the claim was untimely under
MCA 7–5–135(1) and the doctrine of laches.25
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held
that: (1) the suit was timely under Montana law; and (2) Resolution 10–
46 was an administrative act and thus not eligible for repeal by
referendum.”26 The district court did not separately address the doctrine
of laches claim.27 Both the City of Whitefish and the Intervenors
appealed.28
III. MAJORITY OPINION
In a 4–3 opinion, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the
district court’s grant of summary judgement and separately addressed the
laches argument.29 First, the majority held that the plaintiff’s referendum
challenge was timely under MCA 7–5–135(1).30 The statute provides that
“a governing body” may initiate a suit to determine the validity and
constitutionality of proposed initiative or referendum “within 14 days of
the date a petition has been approved as to form.”31 However, the Court
pointed out that the statute’s plain meaning does not apply to nongovernment parties that choose to initiate an action, such as the private
citizen plaintiffs in this case.32
The Court then held that the plaintiff’s claim was not untimely
under the doctrine of laches.33 The Court cited Cole v. State ex rel.
Brown34 as an instance where this equitable doctrine successfully barred
a claim: in that case, the plaintiffs tried and failed to challenge an
initiative that had passed nine years earlier.35 The Court noted that,
unlike the Intervenors in this case, the argument was effective in Cole
. Id.
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 447.
24
. Appellant’s Opening Br., supra n. 4, at 15.
25
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 447.
26
. Id. at 447–448.
27
. Id. at 447.
28
. Id. at 448.
29
. Id. at 449–450, 456.
30
. Id. at 449.
31
. Mont. Code Ann. § 7–5–135(1) (2013).
32
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 448–449.
33
. Id. at 450.
34
. Cole v. State ex rel. Brown, 42 P.3d 760 (Mont. 2002).
35
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 449; Cole, 42 P.3d 760 (emphasis added).
22
23
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because the defendants addressed the laches prejudice requirement,
specifically regarding those who relied on the “presumptive validity” of
the initiative.36 Finally, the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that
Resolution 10–46 was an administrative, rather than a legislative, act by
the City of Whitefish and thus was not subject to the referendum
process.37 Applying the Whitehall factors the Court adopted from the
Kansas Supreme Court in 1998,38 the majority held that the factors
weighed in favor of administrative action: namely that “the decision to
enter the 2010 IA and resolve the 2008 lawsuit, with limited assurances
about the ultimate duration and outcome of the agreement, was a
decision that required specialized knowledge and experience of the
City’s fiscal and other affairs.”39 The Court did not address whether
either interlocal agreement was valid under Montana law.40
IV. DISSENTING OPINION
While Chief Justice Mike McGrath and Justices Patricia Cotter
and Michael Wheat concurred with the majority on the statutory and
doctrine of laches timeliness issues, they dissented regarding the nature
of the City’s action and, consequently, the citizens’ right to repeal the
action by referendum.41 The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s
continued use of the “vague, confusing, and awkward to apply”
Whitehall factors, and instead advocated for a fact-driven, case-by-case
approach “guided by underlying principles of separation of powers and
historical examples of legislative powers.”42 Using this and the Whitehall
approach, the dissent determined that Resolution 10–46 was plainly
legislative because the 2010 IA created zoning authority and “since
adoption of a zoning ordinance would be a legislative act, it follows that
an act granting such authority must also be a legislative act.”43
Additionally, the dissent argued that since the resolution entailed
significant policy changes and the 2005 IA was certainly a legislative act,
it follows that the “amendment of a prior legislative enactment is itself a
legislative act.”44
V. ANALYSIS

. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 449–450.
. Id. at 456.
38
. Town of Whitehall, 956 P.2d at 749.
39
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 452, 456.
40
. Id. at 453 (stating that “we are not deciding in this case whether zoning authority was the proper
subject of an interlocal agreement”).
41
. Id. at 456 (McGrath, C.J. & Cotter & Wheat, JJ., dissenting).
42
. Id. at 456–457.
43
. Id. at 458.
44
. Id.
36
37
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A. The Plaintiff’s referendum challenge was timely under Mont. Code
Ann. 7–5–135(1) and the doctrine of laches
As a threshold matter, it seems clear that the Court correctly
upheld its mandate to “neither insert what has been omitted, nor omit
what has been inserted” with regard to the majority’s plain language
interpretation of Mont. Code Ann. 7–5–135(1).45 While the statute places
a time restriction of 14 days on any “governing body” that wants to file
suit to determine the validity and constitutionality of a petition and
proposed action, no statute bars a citizen or group of citizens from filing
such a challenge.46
The Court’s holding regarding the laches claim also seems
consistent with prior case law and the doctrine’s generally disfavored
status as a defense.47 While the less than vigilant plaintiffs in this case
had several months to challenge the referendum and inexplicably chose
to do so only after citizens had voted strongly in favor of it, the Court has
nevertheless indicated that it will only bar such a claim in extreme
situations, such as those found in Cole. It is well established that
“[l]aches is not a mere matter of elapsed time”: a showing of prejudice is
also required.48 However, without a sufficiently long passage of time, it
seems unlikely that a party will be able to demonstrate the facts
necessary to establish prejudice. Here, the Intervenors could only
demonstrate the effort they had put into the election process, not how
they had subsequently relied on the referendum’s validity.49 In any case,
both the majority and dissent were unwilling to establish precedent they
viewed as “tantamount to requiring all challenges to a ballot measure be
brought prior to election.”50
B. Resolution 10–46 was a legislative act and subject to voter
referendum
Under Montana law, the people have the right to repeal
legislative acts through the referendum process, including ordinances and
resolutions enacted by their local government.51 However, local
governmental powers extend not only to legislative acts, but also to
administrative and quasi-judicial acts.52 Thus, the people may only
. Mont. Code. Ann. § 1–2–101.
. Mont. Code Ann. § 7–5–135(1).
47
. Cole, 42 P.3d at 763–764; 30A C.J.S. Laches, Stale Demands, and Limitations § 138 (WL current
through Mar. 2015).
48
. In re Est. of Wallace v. McAlear, 606 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1980); 27A Am. Jur. 2d Laches; Lapse of
time; Stale Demands § 163 (WL current through Feb. 2015).
49
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 449 (majority).
50
. Id.
51
. Mont. Const. art. V, § 1; Mont. Const. art. III, § 5(1); Mont. Const. art. XI, § 8; Mont. Code Ann.
§ 7–5– 131.
52
. Mont. Const. art. XI, § 4.
45
46

82

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 76

invoke their referenda power to repeal local government resolutions and
ordinances that are legislative in nature.53 In practice, courts have found
it difficult to distinguish a legislative act from an administrative act due
to their overlapping characteristics.54
In Town of Whitehall v. Preece, the Montana Supreme Court
adopted four factors from the Kansas Supreme Court to guide the process
of classifying local government actions.55 Demonstrating the difficultly
of applying these factors, both the majority and dissent applied each
factor in their analysis and came to opposite conclusions on every one.
The majority, while underscoring the fourth factor’s cautionary language
that “no one act of a governing body is likely to be solely administrative
or legislative” and explaining that “these cases are not black and white,”
nevertheless decided to restrain the people’s power in this case because
they viewed the referendum as lacking a “fully legislative purpose.”56
The dissent, on the other hand, pointed out that: (1) the Kansas Supreme
Court recently discarded this fourth factor policy statement because it did
not help that court evaluate specific facts; and (2) the remaining factors
are “confusing, and can unreasonably restrict the voters’ right to
participate in the referendum process.”57 These three factors are
discussed in turn.
The first Whitehall factor essentially states that a legislative act
is a new law that is permanent and general, while an administrative act
executes an already existing law and is thus temporary and limited in
effect.58 The majority found dispositive that Resolution 10–46 was an
amendment to an interlocal agreement, rather than a zoning ordinance,
and that the unilateral termination and renewal provisions provided for
only potential changes to the City’s authority to zone the donut.59 First, it
is important to note that legislative acts can, and often do, take the form
of amendments. Additionally, as the dissent pointed out, the Montana
legislature “periodically enacts statutes that will expire on a certain date
or become effective only upon the happening of a certain event.”60 Thus,
the 2010 IA’s amendatory nature and termination and renewal provisions
don’t seem to provide a sound basis to categorize Resolution 10–46 as an
administrative act under this factor.
The second Whitehall factor ostensibly weighs an act’s policy
objectives.61 Under this factor, if an action declares and provides the

. Mont. Code Ann. § 7–5–131.
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 451.
. Town of Whitehall, 956 P.2d at 749.
56
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 451, 456 (majority).
57
. Id. at 456 (McGrath, C.J. & Cotter & Wheat, JJ., dissenting).
58
. Id. at 451, 453 (majority).
59
. Id. at 453.
60
. Id. at 456 (McGrath, C.J. & Cotter & Wheat, JJ., dissenting).
61
. Id. at 451 (majority).
53
54
55
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means to implement a public purpose, it is legislative.62 If, on the other
hand, the action addresses only a narrow segment of a larger policy
question, it is likely administrative.63 The majority reasoned that since
the 2010 IA only constituted a “few” amendments to the 2005 IA and
since these provision were conditional, the 2010 IA only had the
potential to lead to future policy changes.64 The dissent, while at the
same time questioning the veracity of the factor overall, also explained
that the Montana Legislature frequently enacts legislation that addresses
larger policy questions.65 The dissent also did not find the amendatory
nature of Resolution 10-46 relevant since the “Montana Legislature
routinely enacts statutes which are clearly legislative acts, but which are
amended in future years in ways large or small.”66 Resolution 10–46
contained two amendments that constituted a substantial policy shift for
the City’s zoning authority simply because the goals aimed at protecting
the City’s downtown, highway corridors, and natural resources became
subject to Flathead County’s inherent threat of future termination under
the 2010 IA. Since the certainty and autonomy that once existed under
the 2005 IA was, in effect, eviscerated by the 2010 IA, Resolution 10–46
was a legislative act.
Finally, the third Whitehall factor states that “[d]ecisions which
require specialized training and experience in municipal government and
intimate knowledge of the fiscal and other affairs of a city in order to
make a rational choice may properly be characterized as administrative,
even though they may also be said to involve the establishment of a
policy.”67 It is conceded that the decision to settle a lawsuit is an
administrative act because it requires specialized expertise and
discretionary judgement.68 However, as the dissent stated, “[w]hile the
decision to settle the lawsuit per se may be administrative, it was
undertaken in the separate Resolution 10–47.”69 While the majority
opinion spent much of its opinion rationalizing how Resolution 10-46
was inextricably tied and sufficiently related to Resolution 10-47, it
seems clear that, in this instance, the Court overlooked its obligation to
“neither insert what has been omitted, nor omit what has been inserted”
when it mistakenly interpreted Resolution 10-46 as Resolution 10–47.70
However, on a broader scale, it is hard to comprehend why the
majority continued to rely on the Kansas-adopted Whitehall factors
when, in Kansas, “[t]here is no independent, constitutional right to an
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 451, 453.
. Id.
. Id. at 454.
65
. Id. at 456 (McGrath, C.J. & Cotter & Wheat, JJ., dissenting).
66
. Id. at 457.
67
. Id. at 451 (majority).
68
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 454.
69
. Id. at 457 (McGrath, C.J. & Cotter & Wheat, JJ., dissenting).
70
. Id. at 451–452, 454–455 (majority); Mont. Code. Ann. § 1–2–101.
62
63
64
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initiative; any authority to hold a referendum must come from the
legislature.”71 The Kansas referendum and initiative process is only
authorized in statute and the courts have strictly applied it when judging
the administrative or legislative nature of a petition.72 As a result, “[i]n
Kansas, the initiative and referendum process under K.S.A. 12–3013 has
long been judged on a more demanding basis than in some other
locales.”73
In Montana, “[t]he people reserve to themselves the powers of
initiative and referendum.”74 This power extends to legislative actions of
local government.75 In contrast to Kansas, these rights are reflected, but
not created, in statute.76 If Montana is to follow the “principle that
initiative and referendum provisions of the Constitution should be
broadly construed to maintain the maximum power in the people,”77 we
should not be following Kansas’s framework that has self-admittedly
“never adopted a ‘liberal’ view of the matters which should be subject to
initiative and referendum, but quite the contrary.”78
The majority opinion correctly pointed out that “all actions of a
state legislature are inherently legislative by their very nature.”79 As
such, it follows that if a local government act is sufficiently analogous to
a state legislative act, it should be deemed a legislative act. It is time to
dispense with the Whitehall factors and replace them with the simpler
case-by-case, fact-driven approach advocated for by the dissent and used
in other jurisdictions with similar constitutional provisions as those
found in Montana.80 Only then will the Court be able to more accurately
identify and separate legislative acts from administrative acts, and more
broadly, ensure that Montana’s constitutional guarantee to initiative and
referendum is secure and available for citizens to challenge their
government.

. City of Topeka v. Imming, 344 P.3d 957, 967 (Kan. App. 2015).
. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12–3013 (2014); McAlister v. City of Fairway, 212 P.3d 184, 193–194 (Kan.
2009).
73
. McAlister, 212 P.3d at 193.
74
Mont. Const. art. V, § 1.
75
. Mont. Const. art. III, § 5(1); Mont. Const. art. XI, § 8.
76
. Mont. Code Ann. § 7–5–131.
77
. Chouteau Co. v. Grossman, 563 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Mont. 1977).
78
. City of Lawrence v. McArdle, 522 P.2d 420, 427 (Kan. 1974).
79
. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 455 (majority).
80
. See e.g. Vagneur v. City of Aspen, 295 P.3d 493 (Colo. 2013); Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(9)
(guaranteeing that “[t]he initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by this section are
hereby further reserved to the registered electors of every city, town, and municipality as to all local,
special, and municipal legislation of every character in or for their respective municipalities”).
71
72

